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We present a framework for measuring software quality using pricing and demand data, and
empirical estimates that quantify the extent of quality degradation associated with software ver-
sioning. Using a 7-month, 108-product panel of software sales from Amazon.com, we document
the extent to which quality varies across different software versions, estimating quality degradation
that ranges from as little as 8% to as much as 56% below that of the corresponding flagship ver-
sion. Consistent with prescriptions from the theory of vertical differentiation, we also find that an
increase in the total number of versions is associated with an increase in the difference in quality
between the highest and lowest quality versions, and a decrease in the quality difference between
"neighboring" versions. We compare our estimates with those derived from two sets of subjective
measures of quality, based on CNET editorial ratings and Amazon.com user reviews, and discuss
competing interpretations of the significant differences that emerge from this comparison. As the
first empirical study of software versioning that is based on both subjective and econometrically
estimated measures of quality, this paper provides a framework for testing a wide variety of results
in IS that are based on related models of vertical differentiation, and its findings have important
implications for studies that treat web-based user ratings as cardinal data.
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1 Introduction
Many manufacturers create product lines by first developing a flagship product with an optimal
level of features and functionality, and then creating one or more inferior versions by deliberately
reducing the quality of this flagship product. This practice is commonly referred to as quality
degradation, and many instances of this have been documented in practice. For example, the Intel
486SX processor was initially produced by beginning with a fully functioning 486DX processor, and
then disabling the math coprocessor. In 1990, IBM introduced the LaserPrinter E, which printed
at 5 pages per minute, half the printing speed of the superior IBM LaserPrinter, but used the same
printing engine, though with added firmware that inserted wait states to slow printing. A number
of other examples of “damaging” a flagship product to create inferior versions exist across a variety
of industries, ranging from disk drives to overnight delivery service (Deneckere and McAfee, 1996).
Quality degradation is ubiquitous in the software industry. There are multiple versions of
large number of popular desktop software packages that differ only in their quality or number
of features (rather than in their development or release date), and which are sold at different
prices. At any point in time, one can find different versions of popular software titles like Adobe
Acrobat, TurboTax, Microsoft Money and Norton AntiVirus available. These are examples of
software titles for which a firm has developed a flagship version, disabled a subset of the features
or modules of this version, and released both the higher quality version and one or more lower
quality versions simultaneously. Correspondingly, a large variety of software manufacturers make
a limited functionality version of their product available for free, and charge a positive price for a
full-featured version (Eudora and Eudora Light being a popular example). This prevalence is not
surprising, given that the cost of disabling features or removing software modules is relatively low,
as are the variable costs of producing software.
The theory used to study software versioning and quality degradation typically draws from
second-degree price discrimination (Mussa and Rosen, 1978, Maskin and Riley, 1984). The key idea
drawn from this theory is that of market segmentation using multiple versions that are quality-
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differentiated substitutes, and which are created by strategically distorting down the quality of a
flagship version. Many recent papers in information systems have used this theory to study the
optimal number of versions for a seller of information goods (Jones and Mendelson, 1998, Raghu-
nathan, 2000, Varian, 2000, Bhargava and Choudhary, 2001, 2004, Weber 2002), often concluding
that a single version is optimal. Moreover, this underlying model of market segmentation using
quality distortion is used in an increasing number of related IS studies that investigate, among
other things, licensing in software contracts (Zhang and Seidmann, 2002), optimal software up-
grade paths (Bala and Carr, 2004, Sankaranarayanan, 2005), pricing of online services (Bhargava
and Sundaresan 2003), efficiency and pricing of interorganizational (IOS) systems (Barua, Kriebel
and Mukhopadhyay 1991, Nault 1994), free download policies (Boom, 2005, Tang and Cheng, 2003)
and managing digital piracy (Chen, Wu and Anandalingam, 2003, Snir, 2003, Sundararajan, 2004,
Chellappa and Shivendu 2004).
To summarize, some notion of quality assessment by consumers, and of strategic degradation
of quality levels by sellers is embedded in a variety of IS studies that use the underlying model of
vertical differentiation. Since each of these studies makes different managerial and policy prescrip-
tions based on their models, it seems important to determine how to actually measure levels of
quality and quality degradation predicted by such models, towards setting up a way of testing their
theories empirically, and towards exploring whether quality degradation estimates based on the
model of vertical differentiation seem reasonable. Moreover, since there are a growing number of
Internet-based resources that report more subjective measures of software quality (editorial reviews
and user reviews are the two most common), it is likely that there is some information about actual
customer perceptions of quality differences between software versions contained in such ratings.
The central objective of our study is therefore to empirically estimate the measures of software
quality and quality degradation predicted by the commonly-used economic theory of vertical dif-
ferentiation, to assess how they vary across software titles, and to contrast these estimates with
those based on subjective Internet-based ratings. We do so by making the following contributions:
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(a) We develop a method for directly estimating the extent of quality degradation based on the
framework of price discrimination using vertical differentiation, and using publicly available pricing
and demand data.
(b) We provide the first systematic estimate of the extent of quality degradation in the software
industry, using a 7-month, 108-version panel of demand and pricing data gathered from Ama-
zon.com.
(c) We contrast these economic estimates of quality degradation with two independent subjective
assessments of software quality: editorial ratings gathered from CNET, and average consumer
ratings gathered from Amazon.com.
Our estimates of quality degradation across software versions indicate that, relative to the
assessed quality of the flagship version, the quality levels of inferior versions are degraded from
little as 8% to as much as 56%, and that the extent of degradation varies quite widely across
software titles, and within sets of titles with two versions and three versions. Moreover, we find
that an increase in the total number of versions is associated with an increase in the difference in
quality between the highest and lowest quality versions, and a decrease in the quality difference
between successive (or neighboring) versions. This is consistent with the predictions of the theory
of vertical differentiation.
However, we also find that the economic estimates of quality degradation are significantly dif-
ferent (and significantly higher) than those assessed from subjective ratings. Put differently, when
data about the actual purchasing behavior of customers is embedded into the economic model, it
predicts very different levels of perceived quality differences than those suggested by the subjective
ratings that these customers and other experts assign to the different versions of a software title.
There are at least two possible interpretations of the differences we observe:
(1) The economic theory systematically models wider variations in software quality than are
actually observed in practice. This may have important implications for the managerial and policy
prescriptions derived from models that are based on this theory.
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(2) The numbers/ratings that subjectively measure quality differences between software versions
tend to systematically understate the actual differences, where by actual differences, we mean those
based on economic measures of how much quality affects consumer willingness to pay. In other
words, these ratings, while having an reasonable ordinal interpretation, are not robust cardinal
measures of quality.
Our study makes other research contributions as well. By transforming the parameters of a
commonly-used analytical model into those that can be estimated from demand data, in particular,
to assess quality distortion and quality ratios across versions directly from demand and price data,
we provide a new framework for future empirical studies of software versioning. In our concluding
section, we discuss many directions for future research that might use this framework. We also
report on a fairly comprehensive new method for converting Amazon sales rank data into demand
data, that uses a combination of purchasing experiments and analysis of the ranking time series,
and provides the first such calibration for the computer software industry. Moreover, our analytical
model is developed in a manner that enables one to estimate customer distribution characteristics
from widely available demand data in a straightforward way. This makes future empirical studies
of pricing and quality differentiation in other IT industries more easily feasible. Thus, our paper
also adds to the new emerging stream of literature which has used e-commerce based panel data
to conduct industry specific studies (Ghose, Smith and Telang 2004) and new instances of existing
phenomena such as auctioneer/bidder strategies and price formation in online auctions (Bapna,
Goes and Gupta 2004, Bapna, Gank and Shmueli 2004).
The preceding discussion has highlighted a fraction of the IS literature that is related to our
current paper in its approach to modeling quality degradation. To our knowledge, ours is the
first paper that attempts to empirically validate this modeling approach using data in the software
industry. Research has assessed quality degradation in other industries include studies of the au-
tomobile industry (Kwoka, 1992), the airline industry (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), and the cable
television industry (Crawford and Shum, 2005), although none of these papers contrast econometri-
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cally estimated quality levels with subjective measures. Additionally, there is an impressive body of
literature on software quality (for instance, Kemerer and Porter 1992, Chidambaram and Kemerer
1994, Banker and Slaughter 1998, Slaughter, Harter and Krishnan, 1998, 2000, Krishnan et. al.
2000). Much of this literature is empirical, although our paper differs from theirs on two important
dimensions. First, these tend to study quality issues for large-scale specialized software implemen-
tations in organizations, rather than measuring quality for mass market shrink-wrapped software
like those in our data. Second, they tend to assess and study software quality using supply side
measures — intrinsic measures such as reliability and integrity of the source code, and the number
of defects per function point — while our approach is focused on different demand-side measures of
software quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our analytical model that
relates pricing and quality degradation to customer characteristics, and describes how to connect
the equations of this model to our demand data. Section 3 describes our data set, our method for
converting sales rank data into demand data, and some details on how we estimate our model’s key
parameters. Section 4 presents the results of our estimation of quality degradation in the software
industry, and contrasts them with the subjective measures of software quality. Section 5 concludes
and outlines directions for future research.
2 Model
A monopolist sells n versions of a software product. This seller first develops the highest quality
(or flagship) version, of quality s1, and then degrades the quality of this to create a set of inferior
substitutes, of quality s2, ..., sn, where s1 > s2 > ... > sn. The price charged by the seller for
version i is denoted pi.
Customers are heterogenous in their preferences for quality. A customer of type θ ∈ Θ is willing
to pay upto U(s, θ) for a version of quality s, and U(s, θ) is non-decreasing in both its arguments.
The set Θ is discrete, with elements θi. Customer types are distributed according to a probability
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Figure 1: Illustrates how the utility function varies with increases in quality s, and changes in
customer type θ.
measure F over Θ, and for notational convenience, we denote the measure of customers of type θi as
fi ≡ F (θi). We make the assumption of discrete types for subsequent ease of estimation (more on
this later). Our analysis could equivalently assume that customer types are uniformly distributed
over some continuous interval.
Since the versions are substitutes, each customer purchases upto one version. A customer of
type θ therefore purchases a version of quality si if version i yields the highest positive level of
consumer surplus, that is if:
U(si, θ)− pi > U(sj , θ)− pj (1)
for each j 6= i, and if
U(si, θ)− pi ≥ 0. (2)
The seller’s problem is to choose the optimal number of versions, the quality level for each version,
and their associated prices. We assume that the utility function takes the following simple quadratic
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form1:
U(s, θ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θs− 12s2, s < θ
1
2θ
2, s ≥ θ
. (3)
Equation (3) indicates that customers value increasing quality at a diminishing rate, and the highest
quality level that a customer of type θ is interested in is s = θ. Therefore, if Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θn}, the
socially optimal outcome involves the seller offering n versions, with quality levels s1 = θ1, s2 = θ2,
and so on. We analyze the cases of two types, that is, Θ = {θ1, θ2} and three types, that is,
Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, since our data set contains software titles with either two or three versions.
2.1 Two versions
We start by assuming that Θ = {θ1, θ2}. The seller offers the flagship version of quality s1,
and may offer a second version of quality s2 < s1. It is well known that the seller only need
consider direct mechanisms, will design one quality-price pair for each type, such that these pairs
are incentive-compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR). These conditions yield the following
price equations:
p2 = U(s2, θ2), (4)
p1 = U(s1, θ1)− U(s2, θ1) + p2. (5)
The firm therefore chooses s1 and s2 to maximize
f1[U(s1, θ1)− U(s2, θ1)] + U(s2, θ2), (6)
and the solution to this maximization yields the optimal quality levels:
s1 = θ1, (7)
s2 = max
½
θ2 −
f1
f2
(θ1 − θ2), 0
¾
. (8)
1A more commonly used functional form is even simpler: U(s, θ) = θs, although that predicts that for a good
with constant variable costs, a single version is optimal, which, based on our data, is clearly inconsistent with the
software industry.
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Equations (7-8) indicate that the seller will offer two versions so long as the difference between the
quality preferences of the two types is not too large, and there is a sufficient fraction f2 of lower
type customers. Notice that the flagship version is assigned the socially optimal quality level, while
the quality of the lower version is distorted downwards. In this case, the corresponding prices as
functions of the model’s primitives are:
p1 =
f1
f2
(θ1 − θ2)2 +
1
2
£
θ22 + (θ1 − θ2)2
¤
, (9)
p2 =
1
2
∙
θ22 −
f21
f22
(θ1 − θ2)2
¸
. (10)
We will refer back to these expressions shortly to discuss how we use them to estimate quality.
2.2 Three versions
Next, we assume that Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}. The seller will therefore offer the flagship version of quality
s1, along with upto two other versions with quality s2 < s1 and s3 < s2. The corresponding price
equations from the IC and IR conditions are:
p3 = U(s3, θ3), (11)
p2 = U(s2, θ2)− U(s3, θ2) + p3, (12)
p1 = U(s1, θ1)− U(s2, θ1) + p2. (13)
The firm chooses s1, s2 and s3 to maximize
f1[U(s1, θ1)− U(s2, θ1)] + (f1 + f2)[U(s2, θ2)− U(s3, θ2)] + U(s3, θ3), (14)
yielding the following optimal quality levels:
s1 = θ1, (15)
s2 = max
½
θ2 −
f1
f2
(θ1 − θ2), 0
¾
. (16)
s3 = max
½
θ3 −
f1 + f2
f3
(θ2 − θ3), 0
¾
. (17)
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Assuming that all these quality levels are in fact non-zero, the corresponding expressions for prices
as a function of the model’s basic parameters are:
p1 =
f1
f2
(θ1 − θ2)2 +
f1 + f2
f3
(θ2 − θ3)2 +
1
2
[θ23 + (θ2 − θ3)2 + (θ1 − θ2)2], (18)
p2 =
f1 + f2
f3
(θ2 − θ3)2 +
1
2
[θ23 + (θ2 − θ3)2 −
f21
f22
(θ1 − θ2)2], (19)
p3 =
1
2
"
θ23 −
µ
f1 + f2
f3
¶2 (θ1 − θ2)2
2
#
. (20)
2.3 Linking this theory to prices and demand data
Rather than the numerical values of quality implied by the model, we are interested in the extent
of quality degradation for different products: that is, in the ratios s1/sj , for each j > 1. Given
a set of price data for each of the versions of a software product, one needs estimates of each of
the θi and fi parameters in order to use equations (7-8) or (15-17) to compute these quality ratios.
Further, in the underlying model, notice that the demand for version i is simply fi.
These observations lead to a natural way of linking the theoretical model to a data set of prices
and demand. First, for each product, we observe the fraction of demand realized by each of its
versions, in each of our time periods, and use this as an observation about the corresponding fi. We
use these observations to assess a maximum likelihood estimate of each fi for each product (further
details follow a description of our data). Given these estimates, we can use observed average prices
and the system of equations (18-20) to estimate θ1, θ2 and θ3 (or correspondingly, equations (9-10)
in the two-version model to estimate θ1 and θ2). Notice that, given prices and the fi/fj ratios,
(18-20) is a system of 3 equations in three unknowns. These estimates can then be used in equations
(15-17) or in equations (7-8) to estimate the quality degradation associated with versions of the
software title.
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3 Data and Estimation
3.1 Overview of our data
We estimate our models using a panel data set compiled from publicly available information about
software prices and sales rankings, gathered using automated Java scripts to access and parse
HTML and XML pages downloaded from Amazon.com. The panel includes over 280 products,
with an equal number from each of five major categories — Business and Productivity, Graphics
and Development, Security and Utilities, Children’s Software and Operating Systems. These are
major categories listed by Amazon.com, and resemble a parallel categorization by CNET.com,
although we do not use this categorization in any substantive way.
Of our 280 products, we identify 108 as belonging to a family of different versions of the same
product. In this context, it is important to distinguish between versions and successive generations.
For instance, Adobe Standard 7.0 and Adobe Professional 7.0 are 2 different versions of Adobe
Acrobat 7.0. Similarly, TurboTax Premier 2004, Deluxe 2004 and Standard 2004 are 3 different
versions of TurboTax 2004. On the other hand, Adobe Illustrator 10.0 and Adobe Illustrator CS
are successive generations of Illustrator, and while substitutes, were developed at different points
in time and released over two years apart. As a consequence, this pair of products is not consistent
with our underlying economic model of versioning, in which a seller develops a flagship version and
then strategically degrades its quality to create inferior versions.
We separate our products into two sets. The first consists of all software titles which have 3
different versions. The ordering of these versions is naturally inferred from their titles (a typical
labeling would be Premier, Deluxe and Standard, for instance, in decreasing order of quality).
The second category consists of all products which have 2 versions (often labelled Professional and
Standard, in decreasing order of quality). We end up with 27 software titles with two versions, and
18 software titles with three versions (for a total of 27× 2 + 18× 3 = 108 versions).
We collected data every 8 hours, over a 7-month period (from November 2004 to May 2005).
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Sales Rank 1649.61 1971.26 1 11622
List Price 99.2 226.2 19.99 1799.99
Amazon Price 95.53 208.57 10.95 1699.99
Customer Rating 3.14 0.99 1 5
Number of Reviewers 56.2 81.6 7 606
Table 1: Summary statistics of our data
Each observation contains the product’s list price, its Amazon retail price, its Amazon sales rank
(which serves as a proxy for units of demand, as described further later), the date the product
was released into the market, the average customer rating for the product, the number of reviews
based on which the average rating was computed, and some secondary market data. The summary
statistics of our data are in Table 1.
For benchmarking purposes, we have also collected similar data from Buy.com: sales ranks, list
prices, retail prices and so on. Similar to Amazon.com, Buy.com provides sale rankings of all of its
products publicly and these sales ranks are also based on actual quantities sold at their site. The
Buy.com data exhibits qualitatively similar characteristics as the Amazon.com data, and since we
do not use this data further in our analysis, it is not described.
3.2 Inferring software demand from sales ranks
A few recent papers have used the following Pareto relationship to infer product quantities from
Amazon.com sales ranks
q = δ(SalesRank)β (21)
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) estimate the parameters of this equation for books by associating
demand data with sales rank on the Wall Street Journal best-seller list, and by independently
conducting a purchasing experiment on one book whose actual weekly demand was known to them,
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observing the extent to which its sales rank reacted to their purchases. They estimate the value
of (1/β) to be −1.2. Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003) provide an alternative estimate of the
parameters of equation (21) for books, using data from a book publisher that maps observed sales
rank to the number of copies the publisher sold to Amazon, and estimate β = −0.871 (this is the
parameter β2 in their model), log[δ] = 10.526 (this is the parameter β1in their model).
To our knowledge, there are no corresponding estimates available for software, and industry
specific demand patterns preclude using estimates from book demand for the software industry.
Moreover, in summer 2004, Amazon altered its sales rank system in the following way: they elimi-
nated their three-tier system, updating ranks each hour for most products (rather than merely for
the top products), and they moved to a system that uses exponential decays to give more weight
in the sales rank to newer purchases.
We therefore conducted an independent analysis to convert our measured sales ranks into de-
mand data. We retain the assumption of a Pareto relationship (21) between demand and sales
rank. Over a two-week period in mid-June 2005, we collected hourly sales rank data for each of
the 280 products in our panel, yielding a time series of 336 observations for each product. For
products not ranked too high, a general trend in these time series is an extended downward drift in
the rank value over many hours (that is, the rank becomes a progressively larger number), followed
by intermittent spikes which result in a large upward shift in rank (that is, the rank became a
smaller number suddenly). We interpret these spikes as reflecting time periods in which one or
more purchases have occurred.
A day before this data collection began, we had purchased 1, 2 and 3 copies of different software
titles over the course of an hour. We chose titles that had different initial sales ranks, and also
those for which Amazon reported on the number of items they had in stock, towards confirming
that ours were the only purchases of these titles during that hour. We then tracked the magnitude
of the spikes in sales rank that corresponded to the purchase of one unit, two units and three units,
for different starting sales rank values. This was towards being able to assign hour-over-hour units
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of demand for corresponding changes in our sales rank time series.
This experiment led us to conclude that for products that were highly ranked (that is, which
were ranked 150 or better), there would be a lot of noise in associating changes in sales ranks with
units of demand. There were two reasons for this conclusion. First, the magnitude of change in
sales rank induced by a purchase was relatively small for these highly-ranked products (less than
50). Second, and related, it was likely that the extent to which a product’s sales rank changed was
affected not just by how many units of it were purchased in the last hour, but by how many units
of products ranked close to it were purchased — these are sales ranks, after all, and even with the
same unit sales in an hour, a product’s rank can move up more if lots of nearby products don’t
sell a unit during that hour. This is true of all products, clearly, but for products ranked below
150, the magnitude of the change in sales rank for a unit purchase is high enough to discount these
smaller movements.
We therefore chose to focus on the 186 products whose average sales rank over the two-week
period was between 500 and 5000 (a small number of products with ranks over 5000 had virtually no
demand over the two weeks, and were therefore dropped). We verified that among these products,
and across 336 observations for each products, there were only 5 instances of the sales rank dropping
below 150, and it never dropped below 100. We tracked the changes in sales rank from period to
period for each of these 186 products, and associated units of demand2 with upward shifts of more
than 50 (that is, changes for which rankt−1 − rankt > 50).
This procedure yielded a data set of 186 observations, which associated a weekly demand level
1A low numerical value of sales rank indicates higher demand. An increase in the numerical value of sales rank
indicates a decrease in the rate at which a product is selling. We use the term ”highly ranked” to refers to products
that have higher demand, that is, those products whose sales ranks are low integer values. Therefore, a product with
sales rank 50 is more "highly ranked" than a product with sales rank 5000.
2We also checked changes in rank magnitude between 25 and 50 by hand, towards verifying whether these might
correspond to single-unit sales. Of the hundreds of such changes, only four appeared to be possible sales (in a sample
over which there were thousands of unit sales in the two week period). This seemed like an acceptable level of noise,
and we therefore ignored all salesrank movements below 50.
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Variable Estimated Value
log[δ] 8.352∗∗∗ (0.042)
β −0.828∗∗∗ (0.032)
R2 0.779
∗∗∗ significant with p ≤ 0.001
Table 2: Mapping average sales rank to unit demand for software
with each average sales rank, for two successive weeks. Weekly unit sales ranged from 0 to 16.
Using the implied pairs of average weekly demand and average sales rank, we them estimated the
following OLS equation:
log[q + 1] = log[δ] + β log[rank], (22)
where q is average weekly demand, and rank is the corresponding average salesrank3. The results
of this estimation are summarized in Table 2. To provide a sense for what this estimate implies:
weekly sales of two units correspond to an average salesrank of about 3100, weekly sales of 10 units
correspond to an average salesrank of about 440, and weekly sales of 25 units correspond to an
average salesrank of about 150.
3.3 Estimating the customer type distribution
The preceding experiment enables us to associate our sales ranks with corresponding periodic unit
demand levels. Now, consider a software title with n versions, and demand data over T periods. In
any period t, let the demand for version i be qit, and define the total demand for this title during
period t as qt =
P
i
qit. One can model this demand as the result of qt draws from the distribution
3Similar to Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003), we used White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator (see
Greene, 2000, page 463) to estimate both parameters.
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F over Θ, with the outcome reflecting qit draws of type θi, for each version i of each software title.
Define Qi as the random variable that takes the value 1 if a draw from F yields θi, and takes the
value 0 otherwise. It follows that Qi is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter fi. Therefore,
each realization of a unit of demand for any version of the product is an observation about the true
value of fi, and it is well known that with n such observations, the maximum likelihood estimator
of fi is simply the fraction of true realizations. As a consequence, once we have computed the
periodic demand levels for each version of each title, the maximum likelihood estimate of fi for a
specific software title is simply:
fi =
TP
t=1
qit
TP
t=1
nP
k=1
qkt
, (23)
or the estimated demand for the version as a fraction of the total demand for all versions of the title.
As described in section 2.3, once we have estimates of fi for each version i of each product, we are
able to compute the implied corresponding values of θi, and the corresponding quality degradation
levels.
It is worth noting that our equations always involve a ratio of two fi values (rather than an fi
value in isolation). Therefore, if one chooses the appropriate periodic demand rate associated with
an average sales rank, these ratios can be computed directly from average sales ranks, since, based
on equation (23):
fi
fj
=
TP
t=1
qit
TP
t=1
qjt
,
which, based on equation (21), and an appropriate normalization for the length of the time interval
which cancels out in the numerator and denominator, simplifies to
fi
fj
=
µ
ranki
rankj
¶β
,
where ranki is the average sales rank of product i.
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4 Evidence
Before we present the results of our estimated quality degradation, and contrast them with the sub-
jective measures we have collected, it seems important to distinguish between quality degradation
and quality distortion, since the latter term is used quite extensively in the price discrimination
literature. Our measure of quality degradation for any version is simply the ratio of the estimated
quality of the highest version to the estimated quality of the version in question. For instance, the
extent of quality degradation for the second-highest quality version of a product with three versions
is (s1/s2), which based on (15-16), is:
s1
s2
=
θ1
θ2 − f1f2 (θ1 − θ2)
. (24)
A higher value of this ratio implies a higher difference in quality, and therefore, more significant
quality degradation.
On the other hand, quality distortion refers to the extent to which the quality of an inferior
version i has been distorted below the socially optimal level θi. We also report on our estimated
percentage quality distortion levels, which are simply (θi − si)/θi, though we do not discuss them
much. For instance, the percentage of quality distortion for the second-highest quality version of a
product with three versions, based on (15-16), is:
1− s2
θ2
=
f1
f2
µ
θ1
θ2
− 1
¶
. (25)
4.1 Estimated quality degradation
Tables 3 and 4 summarize our estimates of quality degradation and quality distortion, for software
titles with two versions and three versions respectively. For titles with two versions, we find that the
quality ratios vary from as low as 1.09 to as high as 1.75. This reflects a downward degradation in
the quality of the flagship version from as little as 8% to as much as 43%, with a mean degradation
of about 27%. For titles with three versions, we find that the quality ratios for the medium quality
version (that is, the ratios s1/s2) range from 1.08 to 1.46, thereby reflecting degradation of the
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Product
Quality degradation ratio
(s1/s2)
Quality distortion %
1− (s2/θ2)
Adobe Acrobat 6.0 (WIN) 1.3 12%
Adobe Acrobat 7.0 (WIN) 1.31 13%
Adobe Acrobat 7.0 (Mac) 1.3 12%
Adobe Creative Suite 2 (WIN) 1.21 10%
Adobe Creative Suite 2 (Mac) 1.21 11%
Adobe Video 1.27 11%
Adobe Photoshop 1.4 16%
Macromedia Flash 2004 1.3 13%
Quicken 2001 1.39 18%
Quicken 2002 1.46 19%
Quicken 2003 1.44 17%
Quicken 2004 1.31 12%
Norton SystemWorks 2002 1.38 16%
Norton SystemWorks 2003 1.17 8%
Norton SystemWorks 2004 1.27 11%
Norton SystemWorks 2005 1.32 14%
Norton AntiVirus 2003 1.71 20%
Norton AntiVirus 2004 1.49 16%
Norton Internet Security 2004 1.75 21%
Symantec AntiVirus SBS 1.28 11%
McAfee VirusScan 7.0 1.31 13%
McAfee VirusScan 8.0 1.27 12%
McAfee Internet Security 2005 1.69 21%
Microsoft Encarta 2002 1.34 15%
Microsoft Streets 2005 1.65 24%
Microsoft Windows SBS 2003 1.09 5%
Microsoft Office 2003 1.15 7%
Table 3: Estimated quality degradation and downward quality distortion for software titles with
two versions
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Product Quality degradation ratio Quality distortion %
s1/s2 s1/s3 1− (s2/θ2) 1− (s3/θ3)
Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2005 1.19 1.69 9% 28%
MS Encarta 2003 1.21 1.83 9% 31%
MS Encarta 2004 1.11 2.04 6% 39%
MS Encarta 2005 1.21 1.76 8% 33%
Quickbooks 2002 1.37 1.69 14% 22%
Quickbooks 2003 1.30 1.58 12% 22%
Quickbooks 2004 1.21 1.83 12% 21%
Quickbooks 2005 1.33 1.63 11% 21%
Quicken 2005 1.32 1.88 11% 29%
Turbo Tax 2003 1.34 1.63 14% 23%
Turbo Tax 2004 1.36 1.70 14% 24%
Microsoft Money 2004 1.08 1.68 3% 27%
Microsoft Money 2005 1.16 1.73 8% 29%
Zone Alarm 1.35 1.96 10% 34%
PC-Cillin Internet Security 2005 1.23 2.31 5% 39%
Art Explosion 1.28 1.81 12% 32%
Corel WordPerfect 12 1.46 1.86 20% 28%
MS Windows XP 1.3 1.69 15% 26%
Table 4: Estimated quality degradation and downward quality distortion for software titles with
three versions
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quality of the flagship version from as low as 7% to as high as 31% (with a mean of about 21%).
The corresponding quality ratios for the low quality version (the ratios s1/s3) are between 1.63 to
2.31, which correspond to quality degradation ranging from 39% to as much as 57% (and mean of
about 44%).
These estimates indicate that when a product line has three versions, the extent of quality
degradation between the best version and the second-best version is significantly lower (both on
average, and in its variance) than the extent to which the quality of a second-best version is degraded
when a third version does not exists. However, the extent to which the quality of the lowest version
is degraded when the product line has three versions is significantly more than when the product
has just two versions. We verify these statements by testing the difference in mean between both
pairs of data (finding significant t-statistics in each case). These results are interesting because
they are consistent with what the theory of vertical differentiation would predict. All else being
equal, an increase in the number of versions offered will increase the extent of quality degradation
of the lowest quality version, but will also reduce the differences in quality between neighboring
versions.
Exactly the same statements can be made about the percentage of quality distortion (highest
for lowest of three versions, lowest for second of three versions, significant differences in means).
We do not explore any welfare issues using these estimates, though this represents an interesting
direction for future work.
4.2 Contrasting economic and subjective measures of quality degradation
We next report on our estimates of quality degradation based on two subjective measures of assessed
quality, from CNET and from Amazon.com. A set of editors at CNET evaluate most software
products according to a standard set of review criteria, and rank these products on a scale of 1-10.
According to CNET, they judge a product on the quality and appropriateness of its feature set
along with service and support provided by the firm. They also evaluate the number and severity of
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any bugs as well as the overall ease of setup, configuration, and use. We use these summary scores
from CNET as our first subjective measure of quality, and assess quality degradation by computing
the ratio of scores for different versions of a title. Prior studies have used such rankings as an
objective measure of software quality (for instance, Liebowitz and Margolis 1999). We collected
these scores from CNET’s web site on a periodic basis. Since CNET also archives ratings for older
products, we have been able to gather these ratings for most products in our dataset.
Our second source of subjective quality assessments is from reviews for each product provided
by Amazon.com’s customers. These are part of Amazon’s customer review feature, and each review
contains a written report as well as a numerical score on a scale of 1 to 5. We use the average
numerical score associated with a product as our second subjective measure of quality. We collected
longitudinal data on these ratings, along with the total number of reviewers based on which the
average rating is published. We chose to drop those product ratings which were based on reviews
by 5 or fewer customers. The average number of reviews for the remaining products is 56, and the
number of reviews ranges from 7 to 605 (though most products have 20-50 reviews).
We find that the extent of quality degradation assessed from our economic estimates is sig-
nificantly higher than those assessed from the subjective measures of quality. The mean quality
degradation is significantly higher for comparisons of s1/s2 for products with two versions, and with
three versions, and for comparisons of s1/s3, for the subjective measures based both on CNET ed-
itorial ratings and on Amazon customer reviews. As illustrated in Table 6, these differences are
somewhat higher for CNET than for Amazon. Furthermore, the differences were most stark when
comparing the extent of quality degradation of the lowest quality version for products with three
versions.
There are many ways in which one might interpret these findings. One interpretation might be
that in models of vertical differentiation, the extent to which quality varies across versions in the
model are far wider than are actually observed in practice. In other words, the magnitude of the
optimal quality difference prescribed by the model’s quality parameters si and sj may be higher
20
Product
CNET Ratings
s1/s2
Amazon Ratings
s1/s2
Adobe Acrobat 6.0 (WIN) 1.04 1.17
Adobe Acrobat 7.0 (WIN) 1.08 1.11
Adobe Acrobat 7.0 (Mac) − −
Adobe Photoshop 1.14 1.23
Adobe Creative Suite 2(WIN) 1 −
Adobe Creative Suite 2 (Mac) 1 −
Adobe Video 1.125 1
Macromedia Flash 2004 1.125 0.8
Quicken 2001 1 0.71
Quicken 2002 1.08 1
Quicken 2003 1.14 1
Quicken 2004 1.14 1
Norton SW 2002 1.04 1.17
Norton SW 2003 1.14 1.17
Norton SW 2004 1.26 1
Norton SW 2005 − 0.69
Norton AntiVirus 2003 1 1
Norton AntiVirus 2004 1.0 1
Norton IS 2004 1.05 1.0
Norton AntiVirus SBS − −
McAfee VirusScan 7.0 1.04 −
McAfee VirusScan 8.0 1.04 1
McAfee IS 2005 1.04 −
MS Encarta 2002 1.125 1.5
MS Streets 2005 1.15 1.17
MS Windows SBS 2003 − −
MS Office 2003 1 −
Table 5: Estimated quality degradation based on two subjective quality measures for software titles
with two versions. Blank cells indicate that either no review was available for one or more of the
versions of that product, or, in the case of the Amazon.com numbers, there were too few reviews
(5 or fewer) to include the rating in our data set.
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Product CNET Ratings Amazon Ratings
s1/s2 s1/s3 s1/s2 s1/s3
Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2005 1 1.14 − −
MS Encarta 2003 1 1.33 1 1.33
MS Encarta 2004 1 1.04 1 1.14
MS Encarta 2005 1 1.04 − −
Quickbooks 2002 1.125 1.125 1.2 1.2
Quickbooks 2003 1.04 1.04 1.25 1.25
Quickbooks 2004 1.04 1.04 1.2 1.2
Quickbooks 2005 1 1.14 − −
Quicken 2005 1.1 1.14 1.07 1.5
Turbo Tax 2003 1 1.08 1.5 1.2
Turbo Tax 2004 1 1.14 1.1 1.65
MS Money 2004 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
MS Money 2005 1.1 1.1 1.02 1.33
Zone Alarm 1.04 1.06 − −
PC-Cillin Internet Security 2005 1 1.04 − −
Art Explosion − − 1.14 −
MS Windows XP 1.00 1.125 1 1.13
Corel WordPerfect 12 − 1.04 − −
Table 6: Estimated quality degradation based on two subjective quality measures for software titles
with three versions. Blank cells indicate that either no review was available for one or more of the
versions of that product, or, in the case of the Amazon.com numbers, there were too few reviews
(5 or fewer) to include the rating in our data set.
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s1/s2 for products
with two versions
s1/s2 for products
with three versions
s1/s3 for products
with three versions
Model CNET Model CNET Model CNET
Mean 1.38 1.07 1.25 1.03 1.79 1.10
Variance 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.03 0.01
Observations 23 23 16 16 17 17
t-statistic 7.93 8.59 14.54
p 5E-09 9E-09 1E-12
s1/s2 for products
with two versions
s1/s2 for products
with three versions
s1/s3 for products
with three versions
Model Amazon Model Amazon Model Amazon
Mean 1.37 1.03 1.25 1.14 1.75 1.29
Variance 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Observations 19 19 11 11 12 12
t-statistic 6.25 2.01 8.13
p 2E-07 0.03 3E-08
Table 7: Summary of difference in means tests between the quality degradation levels we estimated
from our data, and those from CNET’s editorial ratings, and Amazon’s average customer ratings
respectively. The numbers under the label "Model" refer to those from our estimates described in
Section 4.1.
than the actual quality difference that is required to obtain the appropriate optimal magnitude in
value difference; the latter difference is what influences the willingness to pay of customers and
the firm’s eventual success with price discrimination based on versioning. This would suggest that
prescriptions from models of versioning or price discrimination that are based on the magnitude of
the quality difference across versions should be interpreted carefully.
Another interpretation might be that the numbers that subjectively measure quality differences
between software versions tend to systematically understate the actual differences, where by actual
differences, we mean those based on economic measures of how much quality affects consumer
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willingness to pay. These subjective ratings might therefore be a good way of ranking different
versions, but their numerical magnitudes may not be appropriate cardinal measures of quality. This
interpretation has important implications for future research, because editorial ratings have been
used as measures of software quality in prior studies, and aggregate customer feedback measures
from eBay, Amazon.com, and various other review sites are frequently used in IS research as cardinal
measures of some form of quality, in studies of seller reputation, movie quality, used-good quality
and so on.
A third interpretation might simply be that editors and customers have a different benchmark
when assessing the quality of different versions, and that these benchmarks (or reference points)
are affected by what the customer/editor expects from a specific version. For example, a rating of
5 on a Professional version might require a higher level of overall quality than a rating of 5 for a
Standard version. This would cause a systematic overstatement of the quality of lower versions as
measured by these average ratings or reviews, which in turn would lead to lower assessed quality
degradation levels.
A preliminary analysis towards a better understanding of the relationship between these objec-
tive and subjective measures did not yield results that were significant enough to report4. Deter-
mining which of these interpretations might be the most valid remains an open question, though
we believe that more data is required to answer this well.
4We estimated equations of the form
∆seco = a+ b(∆ssubj) +
S
i
civersioni +
S
i
di(∆ssubj)versioni,
where ∆seco and ∆ssubj were the economic and subjective quality ratios respectively, and versioni was a dummy
variable that captured whether the ratio was between versions 1 and 2 of a 2-version product, versions 1 and 2 of a
3-version product, or versions 1 and 3 of a 3-version product. We estimated these with and without interacting the
dummy variables with ∆ssubj . None of these generated significant coefficients for the CNET data. For the Amazon
data, a couple of equations had significant coefficients, but since there was sufficient variation in coefficients across
equations, we do not have a good interpretation of their relative magnitudes.
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5 Conclusions and directions for future research
This paper has presented the first empirical study of versioning in the software industry. The
contributions of this study are summarized below:
(1) In order to assess the success of a chosen versioning strategy relative to others, it is useful for
firms to derive an economic measure of the relative quality of each version which has been created
based on quality degradation. This represents a considerable challenge in the software industry,
because while subjective assessments of software value from independent experts and from its end
users are available, there are no natural objective measures of product size or quality (counting the
number of features is not really sensible, for instance). Therefore, objective assessments of software
quality based on economic demand-side measures of a product’s quality can be of managerial value.
We develop a framework for directly estimating the extent of software quality degradation based on
a widely used model of price discrimination using vertical differentiation, and that can be estimated
using pricing and demand data that is publicly available.
(2) We provide the first systematic estimate of the extent of quality degradation associated
with versioning in the software industry. We do so by compiling and using a 7-month, 108-product
panel of demand and pricing data for software sold on Amazon.com. Our results indicate that there
is significant quality degradation associated with software versioning, and significant variations in
its extent across software titles. Our estimates are consistent with theoretical predictions that an
increase in the number of versions is associated with an increase in the quality difference between the
highest and lowest quality version, but a reduction in the quality differences between neighboring
versions.
(3) We provide new estimates of quality degradation between versions using two independent
sources of subjective quality assessments: editorial ratings gathered from CNET, and average user
ratings gathered from Amazon.com. We contrast these estimates of quality degradation with those
from our economic model. We show that the estimates of quality degradation from the latter
are significantly and consistently higher than those assessed from subjective measures of software
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quality, and discuss different interpretations of this measured difference.
(4) We extend existing methods for imputing demand from Amazon.com’s sales rank informa-
tion, and provide the first calibration of this relationship for the software industry.
Apart from providing a first step towards testing other existing IS theories that are based on
models of vertical differentiation, our work suggests a number of new directions for future research,
and provides an infrastructure that can be used to explore these directions. A natural question that
arises from our study is whether software versioning is in fact an optimal strategy for sellers, and if
so, measuring the extent to which it increases profits. It is likely that the benefits from versioning
are related to both the category of software, and the extent to which the flagship version has been
degraded to create each inferior version. Examining this relationship could be of particular interest
to IS practitioners making pricing and product management choices.
We have also provided the first estimates of the extent of quality distortion for software (relative
to the socially optimal quality level of a version). This is a first step towards assessing the magnitude
of the welfare losses that ensue on account of this distortion. However, there are likely to be welfare
gains from the prevalence of versioning, due to the expansion of the set of customers who can afford
a version of the product. Comparing the relative gains and losses from quality distortion, given that
the absence of this kind of distortion would lead to higher prices represents another promising line of
research. A related study might examine whether there is a relationship between measured quality
distortion and subjective measures of quality, based on the hypothesis that subjective ratings assess
product quality relative to a benchmark for that kind of version, rather than relative to the flagship
version, and therefore might measure distortion rather than degradation. An analysis of the text
associated with editorial reviews might be instructive in this regard.
A preliminary exploration of whether there are variations in the differences between subjective
and economic measures of quality degradation across each of our product categories did not yield
significant results, though this may be a consequence of the fact that there are insufficient titles
in each category for any systematic differences to show up. For instance, it may be relatively
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straightforward for consumers and experts to assess the quality of finance and accounting software,
based on their features and ease of installation. However, the quality of security software is much
harder to assess, since it is contingent on future performance at detecting and suppressing viruses,
minimizing the probability of a breach, or detecting an intrusion. Studying this in more detail,
using a larger data set, or perhaps longitudinal data, seems like another interesting direction for
future work.
Finally, while our study has been of the software industry, many of our techniques can generalize
to other IT industries. Future empirical researchers might use our method to map sales ranks to
demand for other categories of products, which would facilitate new industry-specific quality degra-
dation studies that answer related strategic and welfare questions in other IT product industries.
We hope that our study is a first step in this direction.
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